Capital Account Liberalization: Allocative Efficiency or Animal Spirits? by Anusha Chari & Peter Blair Henry
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION:









Henry gratefully acknowledges the financial support of an NSF CAREER award and the Stanford Institute
of Economic Policy Research (SIEPR). We thank Steve Buser, Paul Romer, Antoinette Schoar and René
Stulz for helpful comments. We also thank seminar participants at the AEA, Michigan and Stanford. All
remaining errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2002 by Anusha Chari and Peter Blair Henry.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is
given to the source.Capital Account Liberalization: Allocative Efficiency or Animal Spirits?
Anusha Chari and Peter Blair Henry
NBER Working Paper No. 8908
April 2002
JEL No. E2, F3, F4, G31
ABSTRACT
In the year that capital-poor countries open their stock markets to foreign investors, the growth
rate of their typical firm’s capital stock exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by 4.1 percentage points.  In
each of the next three years the average growth rate of the capital stock for the 369 firms in the sample
exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by 6.1 percentage points.  However, there is no evidence that
differences in the liberalization-induced changes in the cost of capital or investment opportunities drive
the cross-sectional variation in the post-liberalization investment increases.
Anusha Chari Peter Blair Henry
University of Michigan Business School Stanford University
701 Tappan Street Graduate School of Business
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234 Stanford, CA 94305-5015
achari@umich.edu and NBER
pbhenry@stanford.edu  1
1.  Introduction 
There are two broad views of capital account liberalization.  The first view —
“Allocative Efficiency” — argues that removing restrictions on international capital 
movements permits financial resources to flow from capital-abundant countries, where 
expected returns are low, to capital-scarce countries, where expected returns are high.  
The flow of resources into the capital-scarce countries reduces their cost of capital, 
increases investment, and raises output (Fischer, 1998; Stulz, 1999).  The second view — 
“Animal Spirits” — regards Allocative Efficiency as fanciful.  Animal Spirits proponents 
argue that liberalization does not result in a more efficient allocation of capital, because 
international capital flows have little or no connection to real economic activity.   
Specifically, capital account liberalization has no effect on investment, output, or any 
other real variable with nontrivial welfare implications (Bhagwhati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; 
Stiglitz 2000a, b, c).  
This paper confronts the two opposing views of capital account liberalization with 
facts.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s a number of capital-poor countries permitted 
foreigners to purchase shares in their domestic stock markets.  Opening the stock market 
to foreign investors constitutes a discrete change in the degree of capital account 
openness.  This allows us to examine empirically whether the behavior of prices and 
quantities of capital during liberalization episodes are more consistent with Allocative 
Efficiency or Animal Spirits. 
Allocative Efficiency makes two testable predictions about the time series 
behavior of prices and quantities of capital during stock market liberalization episodes.  
First, the flow of resources into a liberalizing country reduces its cost of capital and   2
drives up Tobin’s q—the asset market value of installed capital goods relative to their 
replacement cost.  The second implication follows from the first.  Profit-maximizing 
firms will respond to the increase in q by installing more capital.  Once the asset market 
value of capital goods and their replacement cost are equalized once again, investment 
will slow to a rate that is sufficient to maintain this equality.  In other words, if the 
Allocative Efficiency view is correct, we should observe a temporary increase in Tobin’s 
q and investment during liberalization episodes.  On the other hand, if Animal Spirits 
prevail, then there is no reason to expect an empirical link from liberalization to prices 
and quantities of capital.   
Allocative Efficiency also makes predictions about the cross-sectional behavior of 
investment following liberalization.  Opening the stock market to foreign investors alters 
the set of systematic risks for the representative investor, because liberalization switches 
the relevant benchmark for pricing individual stocks from the local market index to a 
world stock market index.  Consequently, stock prices should move to restore equality of 
risk-adjusted returns when liberalizations occur.  Prices should rise in sectors where 
systematic risk falls and fall in sectors where systematic risk rises.  Under Allocative 
Efficiency, the reallocation of physical capital following liberalization is the dual of the 
stock price revaluation process.  We should observe relatively more investment by firms 
whose systematic risk falls and relatively less by those whose systematic risk rises. 
Time series and cross-sectional estimations on data from 1980 to 1994 for 369 
firms in India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand provide a direct test of whether 
Allocative Efficiency or Animal Spirits better describes the behavior of Tobin’s q and 
investment during liberalization episodes.  The time series results are more consistent   3
with Allocative Efficiency than with Animal Spirits; the typical firm experiences a 
significant increase in both Tobin’s q and investment around liberalization.  The cross-
sectional results are more consistent with Animal Spirits than with Allocative Efficiency; 
there is no evidence that diversification motives drive the reallocation of physical 
investment following liberalization.  Taken together, the results suggest that neither view 
provides a completely accurate description.  Liberalizing capital markets may ensure that 
capital moves from low- to high-return countries, but liberalization alone may not 
guarantee the efficient reallocation of capital across firms within a given country. 
Evidence from previous work that uses aggregate time series data supports 
Allocative Efficiency.  Stock market liberalizations are associated with higher stock 
prices and increased investment in the entire economy (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry 
2000a, b).  In contrast, evidence from aggregate cross-sectional data supports Animal 
Spirits—there is no significant relationship between countries’ investment-to-GDP ratios 
and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) measure of their capital account openness 
(Rodrik, 1998). 
Both sets of previous evidence are difficult to interpret.  Interpreting the time 
series evidence is difficult, because it is not clear that an economy-wide investment boom 
can be attributed to a policy change that affects directly only those firms that are traded 
on the stock market.  In contrast, this paper uses investment data for only those firms that 
are listed on the stock market.  Since stock market liberalization directly affects the 
shadow value of capital for listed firms, these data provide a tighter link to the theory 
than aggregate investment data.   4
The cross-sectional evidence is also difficult to interpret, because it does not 
provide a direct test of Allocative Efficiency.  Examining the correlation between average 
investment and openness tells us whether investment rates are permanently higher in 
countries with capital accounts that are more open.  Allocative Efficiency, however, 
predicts that only a temporary increase in investment will occur when a capital-poor 
country removes restrictions on capital inflows.  This paper examines whether discrete 
capital account liberalization episodes lead to a temporary increase in the growth rate of 
the capital stock, as predicted by the theory. 
One drawback of the experiment is the difficulty of isolating the effects of stock 
market liberalization from those of contemporaneous reforms.  Liberalizations often 
coincide with other policy changes that might affect Tobin’s q and investment.  Another 
disadvantage is that the experiment is narrow.  Stock market liberalizations constitute 
only one specific type of capital account liberalization.  Ultimately, one would like a 
more complete understanding of whether the evidence surrounding the broader capital 
account liberalization process is more or less consistent with the theory.  Nevertheless, 
focusing on a narrow experiment allows for a relatively clean test of the two opposing 
views.  
 
2. Data and Descriptive Findings 
The primary source of data is the International Finance Corporation’s Corporate 
Finance Database.  Singh et al. (1992) and Booth et al. (2001) provide complete 
descriptions of the International Finance Corporation (IFC, 1999) database.  The data 
discussion here provides only those details relevant to this paper.  Between 1980 and   5
1994, the IFC collected annual financial statements for a maximum of the 100 largest 
publicly traded, non-financial firms in eleven developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.  The 
IFC’s collection criteria were that quality data were available for a reasonably large 
sample of firms and that developing countries from each continent were represented.  For 
several countries, the early years of the sample did not contain data of sufficiently high 
quality.  For these countries, the sample begins after 1980.  For some of the smaller 
countries, fewer than 100 firms are traded or meet the data availability criteria, which 
resulted in smaller samples.   
In order for a country to be included in our sample, the IFC must provide balance 
sheet and income statement data before and after the year in which a country liberalized 
its stock market.  This before-and-after criterion, in combination with the short length of 
the time series in some cases, reduces the number of feasible countries to the following 
set of five: India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand.  Despite its modest size — 
there are a total of 369 firms — the sample available from the IFC database is better 
suited to addressing the question of whether liberalization affects firms’ investment 
decisions than competing databases such as Worldscope and Global Vantage.  This is 
because the median stock market liberalization date in the sample is 1988.  Worldscope 
and Global Vantage contain virtually no company data before 1988. 
Table 1 summarizes the essential characteristics of the countries and firms in the 
sample.  Column 1 provides the name of the country; Column 2 lists the year in which the 
stock market was liberalized; Column 3 gives the number of firms in each country.   
Column 4 lists the ratio of stock market capitalization of the firms in the IFC sample to   6
the total stock market capitalization of all publicly traded firms in the country.  The stock 
market capitalization of the 369 firms in our sample constitutes 40 percent of total stock 
market capitalization.  This figure indicates that the firms in the IFC Database comprise a 
significant fraction of all publicly traded companies in these countries. 
 
2A. Construction of Firm-level Capital Stocks and Tobin’s q  
The IFC Corporate Finance Database reports the nominal value of property, plant, 
and equipment on an annual basis.  These annual values are divided by the local 
consumer price index to create an index of each firm’s real capital stock.  For each firm 
in the sample, Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of that firm’s securities to the 
replacement cost of its tangible assets.  The replacement cost of tangible assets is the 
book value of net fixed assets (property, plant and equipment).  The market value of each 
firm’s securities is the sum of the market value of equity — its stock market 
capitalization — and the book value of its current and long-term liabilities.  We use book 
values of debt because the IFC database does not contain information on market values.   
In the absence of directly observable market values of debt, the standard approach 
converts book values of debt to market values in two steps (Blanchard, Rhee, and 
Summers 1993).  First, the book value of short-term debt is assumed to be the same as its 
market value.  The second step converts the book value of long-term debt to market value 
by capitalizing net interest payments using the yield on Moody’s corporate A bond.
1  
This conversion method cannot be applied directly to this study, because data on 
corporate bond rates are not available for the relevant time period.  Estimating the market 
                                                 
1 Equation (1) on page 357 of Von Furstenberg (1977) is used for conversion assuming a ten-year maturity.     7
value of debt would require further assumptions about unobservable corporate bond rates.  
Rather than adopting a cure worse than the ailment, we follow the alternative convention 
of using book values of debt as proxies for market values.   
Another potential concern is that the construction of Tobin’s q measures average, 
not marginal q.  While it is marginal q, the ratio of the increment of market valuation to 
the cost of the associated investment, that matters, the same factors which raise or lower 
marginal q will raise or lower average q.  Thus one would also expect investment to vary 
with the level of average q. 
 
2B.  Do Tobin’s q and Investment Respond to Liberalization? 
Allocative Efficiency predicts that liberalization will raise the market value of 
capital.  Removing restrictions on capital inflows permits financial resources to move 
from capital-abundant countries, where expected returns are low, to capital-scarce 
countries, where expected returns are high.  The flow of resources into the liberalizing 
country reduces the average cost of capital and drives up Tobin’s q.  
If this view has any empirical bite, we should observe an increase in the typical 
firm’s level of Tobin’s q relative to its pre-liberalization mean when the stock market is 
liberalized.  Table 2 verifies this prediction.  The average level of Tobin’s q across all 
369 firms before liberalization is 3.84.  The average level of Tobin’s q in the 
liberalization year is 5.61, approximately 40 percent higher than the pre-liberalization 
mean.  Turning to individual countries, the average level of Tobin’s q in the year of 
liberalization exceeds the pre-liberalization mean in every country except Malaysia.   8
The numbers in Table 2 suggest that q increases with liberalization, but they need 
to be interpreted with caution.  The level of Tobin’s q may not be directly comparable 
across countries, because of differences in accounting practices.  For example, firms in 
India, Malaysia, and Jordan value assets using the practice of fair-market valuation in 
accordance with North American Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  In 
contrast, Korea and Thailand rely on strict historic-cost accounting as in Germany and 
Japan (Booth et al., 2001). 
In light of these differences, growth rates of q provide more compatible cross-
country measures.  Figure 1 shows that the average deviation of the growth rate of 
Tobin’s q from its pre-liberalization mean is 18 percentage points on impact (year [0]), 
11 percentage points in the first year after liberalization (year [+1]), and 8 percentage 
points in the second year after liberalization (year [+2]).  The cumulative deviation over 
years [0, +2] is 37 percentage points. 
Under Allocative Efficiency, profit-maximizing firms should respond to the 
increase in Tobin’s q by installing more capital.  Once the asset market value of capital 
goods and their replacement cost are equalized again, investment should slow to a rate 
that is sufficient to maintain this equality.  To examine this implication of the theory, 
Figure 2 plots the average deviation of the growth rate of the real capital stock from its 
pre-liberalization mean for all 369 firms.  Figure 2 suggests a lagged response of 
investment to stock market liberalization.  On impact, the growth rate of the capital stock 
increases sharply and remains above its pre-liberalization mean for each of the three 
subsequent years.  Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 suggest that, on average, liberalization   9
drives up the relative price of capital, and firms respond to this relative price increase by 
installing more capital. 
 
3.  Time Series Evidence: Are the Increases in Tobin’s q and Investment Robust? 
While roughly consistent with Allocative Efficiency, Figures 1 and 2 must be 
interpreted with caution. They simply describe the behavior of the raw data on Tobin’s q 
and investment without controlling for firm, country, and world-specific factors that may 
drive q and investment independently of any stock market liberalization policies.  This 
section of the paper wrestles empirically with these issues. 
 
3A. Tobin’s q 
We begin by estimating a benchmark regression for the pooled group of 369 
firms.  The regression examines whether, in each of the three years immediately 
following stock market liberalization, the growth rate of Tobin’s q differs significantly 
from its pre-liberalization growth rate:  
(ln ) [0] [ 1] [ 2] [ 3] ijt j j j j i ijt q Lib Lib Lib Lib FIRM αε ∆= ++ + + + + + ++                            (1) 
 
The left-hand-side variable is the growth rate of Tobin’s q for firm i in country  j  in year 
t.   [0]j Lib  is a variable that equals one in the year that country  j  liberalizes its stock 
market.   [1 ] j Lib + ,  [2 ] j Lib + , and  [3 ] j Lib +  take on the value 1 in the first, second and 
third years after liberalization, respectively.  FIRM is a set of firm-specific dummy 
variables, which means that the intercept term, α , measures the average change in the 
growth rate of Tobin’s q after removing firm-specific fixed effects.     10
The error term in Equation (1) requires further discussion.  All firms in a given 
country share the same liberalization date in addition to other country-specific factors.  
Therefore, the standard assumption that the error term for the growth rate of Tobin’s q is 
random and uncorrelated across firms may no longer obtain.  Three steps are taken to 
address this issue.  First, the variance-covariance matrix used to calculate the standard 
errors was adjusted to account for clustering.  Second, the estimation procedure also 
corrects for potential heteroscedasticity across firms.  Third, estimates of Equation (1) 
that include country-specific fixed effects are also presented.  
Table 3, Panel A presents the results.  The first row presents the benchmark 
specification, which controls for firm-fixed effects.  Moving across columns shows the 
estimate for each year relative to liberalization.  For example, the entry under column [0] 
in the row labeled “Firm-fixed Effects” shows that in the year the stock market is 
liberalized, the growth rate of Tobin’s q exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by 18.2 
percentage points.  The adjacent column, [+1], shows that in the year immediately 
following liberalization, the growth rate of q exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by 13.2 
percentage points.  In year [+2], this number is 8.6 percentage points.  All three estimates 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
In year [+3] the growth rate of q falls significantly below its pre-liberalization 
mean.  The negative and significant growth rate of q following an initial rise is consistent 
with the theory.  Liberalization drives up the relative price of capital, and firms respond 
by increasing their capital stock with a lag.  Once investment starts rising, q begins 
falling back toward pre-liberalization levels.  Shortness of the time series prevents 
estimation of the response of q to liberalization beyond year [+3].   11
Row 2 of Panel A presents estimates that control for country-specific 
characteristics other than liberalization that might be driving the results.  The estimates 
are almost identical to those that use firm-fixed effects.  The growth rate of q exceeds the 
pre-liberalization mean by 18.3 percentage points in year [0], 13.3 percentage points in 
year [+1], and 8.7 percentage points in year [+2].  As in the firm-specific estimates, the 
growth rate of q falls significantly below its pre-liberalization mean in year [+3]. 
If liberalizations coincide with high points in the world business cycle, then 
Tobin’s q might increase independently of any change in capital account policy.  There 
are two possible approaches to this problem: indirect and direct.  The indirect approach 
would use year-specific dummy variables to control for movements in the world business 
cycle.  The potential for multicollinearity of the year dummies with the liberalization 
variable makes this indirect approach unadvisable.  Therefore, we attempt to control 
directly for movements in the world business cycle by including the contemporaneous 
growth rate of OECD industrial production, the three-month real US Treasury bill rate, 
and the 10-year real US government bond rate as right-hand-side variables. 
Row 3 presents these estimates.  Accounting for fluctuations in the world business 
cycle reduces slightly the point estimates.  The growth rate of Tobin’s q is now 15.4 
percentage points above the pre-liberalization mean in year [0] as compared to 18.2 in 
Row 1 and 9.7 percentage points above the pre-liberalization mean in year [+1] as 
compared to 13.2 in Row 1.  The point estimate in year [+2] is no longer statistically 
significant.  The negative point estimate in year [+3] is stronger than without business 
cycle controls.  Row 4 re-estimates the country-fixed effects model, but this time includes 
controls for fluctuations in the world business cycle.  These results are almost identical to   12
those in Row 3.  Estimates using various leads and lags of all three business cycle 
controls were also tried but did not yield significantly different results.  Regardless of the 
specification, the point estimates for the growth rate of q in years [0] and [+1] are 
positive and statistically significant. 
 
3B.  Investment 
The following panel regression evaluates the response of the growth rate of the 
average firm’s capital stock to liberalization:  
(ln ) [0] [ 1] [ 2] [ 3] ijt i ijt K Lib Lib Lib Lib FIRM αε ∆= + + + + + + + + +                                  (2) 
This specification is identical to Equation (1) except that instead of Tobin’s q, the left-
hand-side variable is now the growth rate of the capital stock. 
Table 3, Panel B presents the results.  There is a strong relationship between 
liberalization and the growth rate of the capital stock.  Row 1, which presents the firm-
fixed effects estimates, indicates a strong lagged response of the capital stock to 
liberalization.  The growth rate of the capital stock is 5.5 percentage points above the pre-
liberalization mean in year [+1], 6.9 percentage points above the mean in year [+2], and 
3.9 percentage points above the mean in year [+3].  The estimates from the country-fixed 
effects specification in Row 2 are almost identical to the firm-fixed effects specification 
in Row 1.  The estimates in Rows 3 and 4 contain proxies for the world business cycle.  
The only significant change relative to the estimates in Rows 1 and 2 is that the year [0] 
estimates are now statistically significant. 
It is useful to think about the economic significance of the estimated effect of 
liberalization on investment.  The average growth rate of the capital stock across all 369   13
firms in the pre-liberalization period is 10 percent per year.  Now make the following 
assumptions: the production function for all firms is Cobb-Douglas, there is no 
technological progress, the size of the labor force is constant, and capital’s share in output 
is one-third.  With this set of assumptions the pre-liberalization growth rate of output for 
the average firm equals one-third times 10 percent, or 3.3 percent per year.   
The estimates in Row 4 of Table 3 show that the growth rate of the capital stock 
exceeds the pre-liberalization mean by 4.7 percentage points in year [0], 4.7 percentage 
points in year [+1], 8.2 percentage points in year [+2], and 6.9 percentage points in year 
[+3].  To get a rough sense of how much faster the average firm will grow as a result of 
liberalization multiply each of these coefficient estimates by a third, and add the resulting 
number to 3.3 percent.  Doing so suggests that instead of growing at 3.3 percent per year, 
the average firm will grow by 4.9 percent in year [0], 4.9 percent in year [+1], 6 percent 
in year [+2], and 5.6 percent in year [+3].  Rough as they may be, these are large numbers 
with non-trivial welfare implications when one considers that the firms in this sample 
constitute roughly 40 percent of the total market capitalization of publicly traded firms in 
these countries. 
 
4. Cross-Sectional Evidence: Does Risk Sharing Drive the Reallocation of Capital? 
Allocative Efficiency also makes predictions about the cross-sectional behavior of 
investment following stock market liberalizations.  Liberalization alters the set of 
systematic risks for the representative investor, because the relevant benchmark for 
pricing individual stocks switches from the local stock market index to a world index.  
Stock prices should rise in sectors where systematic risk — and therefore the cost of   14
capital — falls.  The stock price data are consistent with this prediction (Chari and Henry 
2001).  But optimal smoothing of production risk in an open-capital-market world also 
requires the reallocation of physical capital in accordance with changes in systematic 
risk.  All else equal, we should observe relatively more investment by firms whose 
systematic risk falls and relatively less investment by those whose systematic risk rises. 
To investigate these predictions, define the variable DIFCOV as follows: The 
covariance of a firm’s stock return with the local market index minus the covariance of 
that firm’s stock return with the world stock market index.  Allocative Efficiency predicts 
that the capital stocks of high DIFCOV firms will grow more quickly than those of the 
low DIFCOV firms following liberalization.  We move towards testing this prediction by 
constructing two measures of DIFCOV for each firm in the sample.  For firm i in country 
j, DIFCOV1 is calculated as follows.  First we calculate the historical covariance of firm 
i's annual stock return with the annual aggregate market return for country j.  Second, we 
calculate the covariance of firm i's annual stock return with the annual return on the 
Morgan Stanley World Capital Market Index (MSCI).  DIFCOV1 equals the first 
covariance minus the second.  We calculate DIFCOV2 by following the same steps, but 
instead of using stock returns to calculate covariances, we use growth rates of real 
earnings. 
We test the prediction that capital will be reallocated towards sectors that provide 
the greatest diversification benefits following liberalization by regressing the cumulative 
deviation of the percentage change in the capital stock from its pre-liberalization mean 
over various horizons on DIFCOV1 and DIFCOV2, a proxy for the change in expected 
earnings growth, and country-fixed effects.     15
12 ˆ 12 ijt i i j ijt KDEV DIFCOV DIFCOV Earnings Country α ββ ε =+ + + ∆ + +                    (3) 
The symbol  ˆ
ijt KDEV  denotes the following.  For country j, it is the growth rate of firm i's 
capital stock at time t minus the average growth rate of firm i’s capital stock in the pre-
liberalization period.  The country-fixed effects remove the liberalization shock that is 
common to all firms: a countrywide fall in the cost of capital.   
The data do not support the prediction that capital is reallocated across firms in 
accordance with optimal risk sharing.  The estimates in Rows 1 and 2 of Table 4 show 
that the cumulative change in the capital stock over the period [0, +3] is not significantly 
related to either measure of diversification.  The coefficients on DIFCOV1, the measure 
based on returns covariances, and DIFCOV2, the measure based on firm level earnings 
covariances, are insignificant in all specifications.  Moving across columns, equation (3) 
was also estimated using cumulative capital stock growth over the following horizons: [0, 
+2], [0, +1], [+1, +2].  The point estimates on DIFCOV1 and DIFCOV2 are statistically 
insignificant in each of these specifications. 
 
4A.  Is the Reallocation of Capital Related to Changes in Tobin’s q 
A fall in the cost of capital stemming from risk sharing is just one of the two 
channels through which liberalization may affect investment.  Liberalization may also 
change firms’ expected future profitability.  Movements in Tobin’s q capture changes in 
both the cost of capital and expected future profitability.  Therefore, as an additional test 
of Allocative Efficiency we examine whether post-liberalization changes in the capital 
stock are related to the liberalization-induced changes in Tobin’s q.  All else equal, firms   16
that experience the largest increases in q should also experience the largest increases in 
investment.   
We examine this prediction as follows.  For each firm, we regress the cumulative 
deviation of the growth rate of the capital stock from its pre-liberalization mean, over 
various horizons, on the on-impact deviation of the growth rate of q from its pre-
liberalization mean.  Row 3 of Table 4 shows that the result is the same for all event 
windows.  The on-impact deviation of the growth rate of Tobin’s q has no explanatory 
power for post liberalization changes in the capital stock.  As a final test of the theory we 
replace the on-impact change in q with the on-impact change in the stock price.  The 
results, presented in Row 4, are the same.  The cross-sectional changes in the price of 
capital have no explanatory power for the cross-sectional changes in quantities of capital. 
 
5. Discussion 
It is important to understand whether physical capital is efficiently reallocated 
when barriers to capital movements are removed.  Previous work shows that 
liberalization induces stock price revaluations (Henry, 2000a).  These revaluations have 
two components.  The first is common to all firms: a fall in the risk-free rate as the 
country moves from financial autarky to financial integration with the rest of the world.  
The second is specific to any given firm.  Prices rise for firms whose systematic risk falls 
and fall for firms whose systematic risk rises (Chari and Henry, 2001).   
These revaluations signal to managers that they can increase shareholder welfare 
by investing in physical capital (Blanchard et al. 1993; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1990; Wurgler, 2000).  On average, investment should increase for all firms in the   17
economy because the risk free rate has fallen.  This is the time series implication of 
liberalization for the reallocation of capital across countries.  We should also observe 
relatively more investment by firms whose systematic risk falls and relatively less 
investment by those firms whose systematic risk rises.  This is the cross-sectional 
implication of liberalization for the reallocation of capital within countries. 
The time series results are more consistent with Allocative Efficiency than with 
Animal Spirits.  The typical firm in our sample experiences a significant increase in both 
Tobin’s  q and investment around liberalization.  The cross-sectional results are more 
consistent with Animal Spirits than with Allocative Efficiency.  The reallocation of 
physical investment following liberalization bears no significant correlation to changes in 
systematic risk or investment opportunities. 
Taken together, these results suggest that neither view provides a complete 
description of the adjustment process.  Liberalizing capital markets appears to facilitate 
an efficient transfer of capital from low to high-return countries.  But capital is fungible, 
so there is no guarantee that the inflow of real resources will be allocated efficiently 
across firms.  However, if the magnitude of the firm-specific component of the 
revaluation is small, then its impact on resource allocation may also be small.  Therefore, 
an alternative interpretation of our results is that the firm-specific fall in the cost of 
capital pales in comparison to the fall in the average cost of capital for all publicly traded 
firms. 
Yet another alternative interpretation is that the absence of empirical support for 
the cross-sectional predictions stems not from Animal Spirits, but a lack of empirical 
power.  Data availability restricts the empirical analysis to only three years following the   18
liberalizations, but the reallocation of capital across firms may take several years to 
complete.  This explanation appears at odds with the adjustments to the aggregate capital 
stock that take place within the three-year window.  Investment responds to liberalization, 
but it does so in a somewhat indiscriminate manner. 
This paper provides a first step towards understanding whether physical 
investment is efficiently reallocated when barriers to capital movements are removed.  
Future work should try to determine the factors that drive the cross-sectional distribution 
of new capital across firms within a given country.  There are models of investment in the 
corporate finance literature that generate predictions about the cross-sectional 
determinants of firm-level investment, which could be applied to capital account 
liberalization.  For example, it could be the case that firms in industries that are more 
dependent on external finance show the largest increase in investment (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998).  Yet other explanations could be related to the political economy of 
liberalization.  Firms that receive preferential government treatment may be better 
positioned to raise stock market financing than other firms (Johnson and Mitton, 2001).  
Preferential treatment may in turn determine which firms are made investible.  The 
available data cannot resolve these issues.  Nevertheless, they do bring us a step closer to 
understanding whether removing barriers to international capital flows promotes efficient 
resource allocation.  Future research may bring us yet nearer.   19
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]
[
3
]
i
j
t
i
i
j
t
K
L
i
b
L
i
b
L
i
b
L
i
b
F
i
r
m
α ε
∆
=
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
.
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
1
,
 
2
,
 
3
,
 
4
,
 
a
n
d
 
5
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
y
e
a
r
 
a
n
d
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
1
,
2
 
a
n
d
 
3
 
p
o
s
t
-
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
 
6
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
u
r
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
t
o
g
e
t
h
e
r
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
l
e
f
t
-
h
a
n
d
-
s
i
d
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
o
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
(
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
)
.
 
 
R
o
w
 
1
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
r
m
-
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
 
 
R
o
w
 
2
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
-
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
 
 
R
o
w
 
3
 
i
n
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
f
o
r
 
b
o
t
h
 
f
i
r
m
-
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
w
o
r
l
d
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
c
y
c
l
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
:
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
n
e
o
u
s
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
O
E
C
D
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
,
 
t
h
e
 
t
h
r
e
e
-
m
o
n
t
h
 
r
e
a
l
 
U
S
 
T
r
e
a
s
u
r
y
 
b
i
l
l
 
r
a
t
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
1
0
-
y
e
a
r
 
r
e
a
l
 
U
S
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
b
o
n
d
 
r
a
t
e
.
 
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
f
o
r
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
r
r
o
r
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
s
y
m
b
o
l
s
 
(
*
*
*
)
,
 
(
*
*
)
 
a
n
d
 
(
*
)
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
1
%
,
 
5
%
 
a
n
d
 
1
0
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
  
2
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
4
:
 
A
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
v
e
 
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
D
o
 
N
o
t
 
E
x
p
l
a
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
C
r
o
s
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
V
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
P
o
s
t
-
L
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
.
 
 
 
 
K
D
E
V
 
[
0
,
 
+
3
]
 
 
K
D
E
V
[
0
,
 
+
1
]
 
 
 
K
D
E
V
 
[
0
,
 
+
2
]
 
 
 
K
D
E
V
 
[
+
1
,
 
+
2
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
I
F
C
O
V
1
 
 
0
.
0
0
1
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
9
9
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
0
8
 
(
0
.
6
1
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
1
7
 
(
0
.
8
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
4
2
 
(
0
.
5
6
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
I
F
C
O
V
2
 
 
-
0
.
0
2
 
(
0
.
0
3
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
0
0
1
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
2
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
0
.
0
0
7
 
(
0
.
0
2
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
0
.
0
1
6
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
1
6
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q
D
E
V
[
0
]
 
 
-
0
.
0
9
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
9
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
0
.
0
7
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
5
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
0
.
0
6
 
(
0
.
0
7
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
0
.
0
0
2
 
(
0
.
0
5
0
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
D
E
V
[
0
]
 
 
0
.
0
2
 
(
0
.
0
9
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
0
2
 
(
0
.
0
6
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
0
4
 
(
0
.
0
8
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
0
5
 
(
0
.
0
5
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
 
T
h
e
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
f
r
o
m
 
i
t
s
 
p
r
e
-
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
m
e
a
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
(
0
,
1
)
 
w
i
n
d
o
w
 
p
o
s
t
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
 
3
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
(
0
,
1
,
2
)
 
w
i
n
d
o
w
 
p
o
s
t
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
 
4
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
(
0
,
1
,
2
,
3
)
 
w
i
n
d
o
w
 
p
o
s
t
-
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
 
5
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
(
1
,
2
)
 
w
i
n
d
o
w
 
p
o
s
t
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
Q
D
E
V
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
T
o
b
i
n
’
s
 
q
 
o
n
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
y
e
a
r
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
q
 
p
r
e
-
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
 
d
l
n
p
 
(
l
i
b
)
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
u
p
o
n
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
y
e
a
r
.
 
 
D
i
f
c
o
v
1
 
a
n
d
 
D
i
f
c
o
v
2
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
t
w
o
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
c
o
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
.
 
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
 
 F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
:
 
T
o
b
i
n
'
s
 
q
 
a
n
d
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
L
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
1
-
0
.
0
5
0
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
.
1
5
0
.
2
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
Y
e
a
r
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
L
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
q
h
a
t
d
e
vF
i
g
u
r
e
 
2
:
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
L
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
4
-
0
.
0
3
-
0
.
0
2
-
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
3
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
6
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
Y
e
a
r
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
L
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
k
h
a
t
d
e
v
 